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Our goal is to provide different semiring-based formal tools for the specification of security require-
ments: we quantitatively enhance the open-system approach, according to which a system is partially
specified. Therefore, we suppose the existence of an unknown and possibly malicious agent that
interacts in parallel with the system. Two specification frameworks are designed along two different
(but still related) lines. First, by comparing the behaviour of a system with the expected one, or by
checking if such system satisfies some security requirements: we investigate a novel approximate
behavioural-equivalence for comparing processes behaviour, thus extending the Generalised Non
Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) approach with scores. As a second result, we equip a modal
logic with semiring values with the purpose to have a weight related to the satisfaction of a formula
that specifies some requested property. Finally, we generalise the classical partial model-checking
function, and we name it as quantitative partial model-checking in such a way to point out the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions that a system has to satisfy in order to be considered as secure, with
respect to a fixed security/functionality threshold-value.
1 Introduction
The considerable amount of trust and decentralisation, coming with today’s software systems, demands
for a rigorous security analysis. Unfortunately, security is frequently in conflict with the functionality
and performance requirements of a system, making 100% security an impossible or overly expensive
goal to be accomplished. For instance, non-functional requirements add to the picture costs, execution
times, and rates. Therefore, the relevant question is not whether a system is secure, but rather how much
security it provides under such “soft” constraints. Instead of a plain yes/no answer, quantitative levels
of security can express different degrees of protection, and allow a security expert to reason about the
trade-off between security and conflicting requirements (e.g., on performance). Quantitative security
analysis [21] has been already applied, e.g., to name a few, for quantifying the side-channel leakage
in cryptographic algorithms, for capturing the loss of privacy in statistical data analysis or information
flows, and for quantifying security in anonymity networks.
Improving a quantitative security-analysis requires different tools for the rigorous development of
practical systems, and an extended formal foundation for the management of security risks. Here we
focus on the latter task. The goal of this paper is to move from a qualitative interpretation of security to
a quantitative one. The basic ingredients in our “recipe” are c-semirings [7, 8] (or simply “semirings”
in the following) and the Generalised Process Algebra (GPA) [10], a quantitative process-algebra where
actions are labelled with a value taken from a semiring. Therefore, we use GPA to model processes with
quantitative aspects: different semiring instantiations can parametrically model different cost-metrics. In
order to formalise security-properties of GPA processes, we provide two different approaches.
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The first approach consists in providing several definitions of quantitative behavioural-equivalencies
in such a way to extend with quantities the family of security properties that can be expressed in
Generalised Non Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) [17]. The GNDC schema is a uniform ap-
proach for defining security properties derived from the Non Deducibility on Composition (NDC) prop-
erties [19, 15]. The GNDC scheme uniformly expresses many security properties as, e.g., fault tolerance
properties (fail stop, fail silent, fail safe and fault tolerant behaviour, e.g., [22]) or, also, many security
properties of cryptographic protocols as, e.g., secrecy, authentication, integrity, etc. [16]. Hence, we for-
malise the system through quantitative observational relations. We introduce the notion of quantitative
trace-equivalence, and we recall the definition of quantitative bisimulation given in [27]. Furthermore,
we extend both these relations by considering an approximate version of them: the ε-equivalence. By
using these equivalence relations, we can compare and specify different security properties, as a quanti-
tative extension of NDC and bisimulation-based NDC properties (BNDC) [19, 15].
In the second approach we present in this paper, we first introduce a semiring-based extension
of the classical Hennessy-Milner Logic (named c-HM Logic) as a means to quantitatively measure the
satisfaction of a given formula: its truth value can now be not only true/false, but a numeric value as well
(e.g., 50% or 3e). Note that by exploiting the boolean semiring (i.e., 〈{false, true},∨,∧, false, true〉) we
can still enforce yes/no only requirements. Hence, we use c-HM Logic in the frame of Partial Model
Checking (PMC) [2]. Classical Model Checking (MC) involves using verification tools to exhaustively
search in a process/protocol specification for all the execution sequences with some desired properties.
PMC focuses this verification on part of a system only: the main advantage is to perform a full analysis
while avoiding the combinatorial explosion of the state space. In security, the PMC function has been
often used to point out necessary and sufficient constraints on the unspecified/unknown part of a system
that is supposed to show a malicious behaviour. Hence, a controller program is required to ensure the
correct behaviour of the whole system, comprehensive of the attacker [24]. In a quantitative scenario, we
associate the notion of satisfiability of a logic formula with the security/functionality level of a system.
Once we set a satisfiability threshold t ∈ K, if the system quantitatively satisfies a security requirement
φ with a value k worse than t, then we can state that the investigated system is not quantitatively secure.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 we recall c-semiring algebraic structures and GPAs. In
Sec. 3 we introduce our first approach, which aims at comparing a system behaviour with the expected
one: we adopt both trace and bisimulation equivalence. Hence, we rephrase them as approximate rela-
tions, in order to include “close”-enough processes, where close is related to a threshold-score ε . In this
way, we are able to specify some security aspects formalised as a quantitative GNDC schema. In Sec. 4
we describe security properties via a semiring-based modal logic (i.e., c-HM), and in Sec. 5 we define a
QPMC function with the purpose to point out the necessary and sufficient conditions each subsystem has
to satisfy for guaranteeing such requirements. Finally, Sec. 6 summarises the related work in literature,
and Sec. 7 wraps up the paper with conclusions and proposes some future work.
2 Background
In this section we recall the necessary fundamental notions about c-semirings [7, 8] and Generalised
Process Algebra [10], a quantitative process-algebra based on semirings.
2.1 Semirings
Definition 2.1 (semiring [20]). A commutative semiring is a five-tuple K= 〈K,+,×,⊥,⊤〉 such that K is
a set, ⊤,⊥∈ K, and +,× : K×K → K are binary operators making the triples 〈K,+,⊥〉 and 〈K,×,⊤〉
commutative monoids (semigroups with identity), satisfying
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• (distributivity) ∀a,b,c ∈ K.a× (b+ c) = (a×b)+ (a× c).
• (annihilator) ∀a ∈ A.a×⊥=⊥.
Proposition 2.1 (absorptive semirings [20]). Let K be a commutative semiring. Then these two proper-
ties are equivalent:
• (absorptiveness) ∀a,b ∈ K.a+(a×b) = a.
• (⊤ absorbing element of +) ∀a ∈ K.a+⊤=⊤.
Absorptive semirings are referred also as simple, and their + operator is necessarily idempotent [20,
Ch. 1, pp. 14]. Semirings where + is idempotent are called as dioids.
Definition 2.2 (c-semiring [7]). C-semirings are commutative and absorptive semirings. Therefore, c-
semirings are dioids where ⊤ is an absorbing element for +.
The idempotency of + leads to the definition of a partial ordering ≤K over the set K (K is a poset).
Such partial order is defined as a ≤K b if and only if a+ b = b, and + becomes the least upper bound
(lub, or ⊔) of the lattice 〈K,≤K〉. This intuitively means that b is “better” than a. As a consequence, we
can use + as an optimisation operator and always choose the best available solution.
Some more properties can be derived on c-semirings [7]: i) both + and × are monotone over ≤K , ii)
× is intensive (i.e., a× b ≤K a), iii) × is closed (i.e., a× b ∈ K), and iv) 〈K,≤K〉 is a complete lattice.
⊥ and ⊤ are respectively the bottom and top elements of such lattice. When also × is idempotent, i)
+ distributes over ×, ii) × is the greater lower bound (glb, or ⊓) of the lattice, and iii) 〈K,≤K〉 is a
distributive lattice.
Semirings and c-semirings have been often adopted in Computer Science and Operation Research as
a very simple but very expressive optimisation structure [30]. Some c-semiring instances are: boolean
〈{F,T},∨, ∧,F,T〉1, fuzzy 〈[0,1], max,min,0,1〉, bottleneck 〈R+ ∪{+∞}, max,min,0,∞〉, probabilis-
tic 〈[0,1],max,×ˆ,0,1〉 (known as the Viterbi semiring), tropical 〈N∪ {+∞},min,+ˆ,+∞,0〉. Capped
operators stand for their arithmetic equivalent.
Although c-semirings have been historically used as monotonic structures where to aggregate costs
(and find best solutions), the need of removing values has raised in local consistency algorithms and non-
monotonic algebras using constraints (eg [8]). A solution comes from residuation theory [9], a standard
tool on tropical arithmetics that allows for obtaining a division operator via an approximate solution to
the equation b× x = a.
Definition 2.3 (division [8]). Let K be a tropical semiring. Then, K is residuated if the set {x ∈ K |
b× x≤ a} admits a maximum for all elements a,b ∈ K, denoted as a÷b.
Since a complete2 dioid is also residuated, we have that all the classical instances of a c-semiring
presented above are residuated, i.e., each element in K admits an “inverse”, which is unique in case ≤K
is a total order. For instance, the unique “inverse” a÷b in the weighted semiring is defined as follows:
a÷b = min{x | b+ˆx ≥ a}=
{
0 if b≥ a
a−ˆb if a > b
Definition 2.4 (unique invertibility [8]). Let K be an absorptive, invertible semiring. Then, K is uniquely
invertible iff it is cancellative, i.e., ∀a,b,c ∈ A.(a× c = b× c)∧ (c 6= 0)⇒ a = b.
Note that since all the previously listed semirings (e.g., tropical and fuzzy) are cancellative, they are
uniquely invertible as well. Furthermore, it is also possible to consider several optimisation criteria at
the same time: the cartesian product of semirings is still a semiring. Clearly, in this case the ordering
induced by + is partial, e.g., when we have 〈k1,k2〉 and 〈k3,k4〉, and k1 ≤ k3 while k2 ≥ k4.
1Boolean c-semirings can be used to model crisp problems.
2
K is complete if it is closed with respect to infinite sums, and the distributivity law holds also for an infinite number of
summands [8].
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2.2 Generalised Process Algebra
In a quantitative process, observable transitions are labelled with some value associated with a step in
the behaviour of a system. In GPA [10] the authors use semirings to model two fundamental modes
of composing observable behaviour, either by combination of different traces, or by sequential compo-
sition. Process algebras are simple languages with precise mathematical semantics, tailored to exhibit
and study specific features of computation. Typically, a process P, specified by some syntax, may non-
deterministically execute several labelled transitions of the form P a→ P′, where a is an observable effect
and P′ is a new process. In quantitative process algebras, transitions are labelled by pairs (a,k) where k
is a quantity associated to the effect a: thus, P (a,k)−−→ P′.
We define transition systems where transitions are labelled with symbols from a finite alphabet and
from a semiring K. The semantics of a GPA process P is Multi Labelled Transition System (MLTS) [10]:
Definition 2.5 (MLTS). A (finite) Multi Labelled Transition System (MLTS) is a five-tuple MLTS =
(S,Act,K,T,s0), where S is the countable (finite) state space, s0 ∈ S is the initial state,3 Act is a finite set
of transition labels, K is a semiring used for the definition of transition costs, and T : (S×Act×S)−→K
is the transition function.
Definition 2.6 (GPA syntax [10]). The set P of agents, or processes, in GPA over a countable set of
transition labels Act and a semiring K is defined by the grammar
P ::= 0 | (a,k).P | P+P | P‖A P | P\A | P/A | X | X , P
where a ∈ Act, A ⊆ Act\{τ} is a subset of actions, k ∈ K (the set of values in a semiring K), and X belongs to a
countable set of process variables, coming from a system of co-recursive equations of the form X , P, meaning
that X behaves like P. GPA(K) denotes the set of GPA processes labelled with weights in K.
The formal operational semantics of GPA operators is given in Tab. 1, Informally, process 0 describes
inaction or termination; (a,k).P performs a with value k and evolves into P; P+P′ non deterministically
behaves as either P or P′; P‖A P′ describes the process in which P and P′ proceed concurrently when they
perform actions belonging to A, and independently on all the other actions; P\A expresses the fact that
actions from the set A are hidden, i.e., they become τ actions that are no longer usable in joint actions
with an environment; the dual, i.e., P/A, restricts the behaviour of P by allowing it to perform only
actions not in A.
Given a GPA process P, the set of derivatives of a P is defined as Der(P) = {P′ | P →∗ P′} where
→∗ is ∪a∈Act,k∈K
a,k
→; Sort(P) denotes the set of actions names that syntactically appear in P regardless
their values.
Being a1, . . . ,an ∈ Act, a trace is a sequence (a1,k1) · · · (an,kn) leading from process P to process
Q. We call T (P) the set of traces rooted in P. Given a trace (a1,k1) · · · (an,kn), we define its label
l(t) = a1 · · ·an, and its weak run-weight |t|= k1× . . .× kn ∈ K (where × comes from a semiring K). We
also define the strong run-weight ‖t‖ of a trace, as the weak-run weight without the weights of τ actions.
Hence, it is possible to evaluate the whole behaviour of a process. The valuation of the 0 process
is equal to ⊤. We consider processes different form 0 as evaluated in the optimistic way, i.e., their
evaluation coincides with the value of their best trace(s). Formally, given a process P 6= 0, the weak
evaluation-value is computed as
JPK =
K
∑
{t∈T (P)}
|t|,
3We simplify the original definition of MLTS given in [10], where an initialization function is taken into account to assign
a quantitative valuation to each of the n initial states (here we only have one s0).
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(a,k).P a,k→ P
P
(a,k)
−−→ P1 P′
(a,l)
−−→ P′1
P‖A P′
(a,k×l)
−−−−→ P1‖A P′1
a ∈ A P
(a,k)
−−→ P1
X
(a,k)
−−→ P1
X , P
P
(a,k)
−−→ P1
P‖A,P′
(a,k)
−−→ P1‖A P′
a 6∈ A Pj
(a,k)
−−→ P1
∑
i∈I
Pi
(a,kΣ)
−−−→ P1
j ∈ I P
′ (a,k)−−→ P′1
P‖A P′
(a,k)
−−→ P‖A P′1
a 6∈ A
P′
(a,k)
−−→ P′1
P\A (a,k)−−→ P′1\A
a 6∈ A P
(a1,k1)
−−−−→ P′ . . .P
(an,kn)
−−−−→ P′
P\A (τ,kτ )−−−→ P′\A
{a1, . . .an} ⊆ A∪{τ}
P′
(a,k)
−−→ P′1
P/A (a,k)−−→ P′1/A
a 6∈ A
Table 1: An operational semantics for GPA [10], where kΣ = ∑i∈I(Pi a→ P1) and kτ = ∑ni=1(ki).
where
K
∑ is the set-wise version of the + operator in K. The strong evaluation-value is computed as
J[PK] =
K
∑
{t∈T (P)}
‖t‖.
3 Quantitative Generalized Non Deducibility on Composition
The GNDC schema is a uniform approach for defining several security properties based on the compo-
sitionality nature of the process algebra formalism. It has been introduced in [17] to express security
properties in a qualitative way. Hereafter, we extend that definition in order to express, in a uniform way,
quantitative security properties. Therefore, what we achieve is to be able to quantitatively compare the
behaviour of two GPA processes, according to possible different definitions of quantitative behavioural
relations (e.g., a weighted trace-equivalence relation).
Hence, we have a quantitative version of the GNDC schema, hereafter denoted as QGNDC, given in
terms of GPA:
P ∈ QGNDCα ,K⊳ iff ∀E ∈ EH : (P‖HX)\H ⊳K α(P) (1)
where H ⊆ Act\{τ} is the set of environmental actions, EH is the set of environments, ⊳K ∈P×P is a
relation between two processes, whose definition depends on the partial order of the semiring K accord-
ing to which the processes are quantified and evaluated, and α : P →P is a function between processes.
The ‖H is the synchronisation operator stating that all actions in H are performed by the system if and
only if both P and E perform them, and the \H is the hiding operator that hides all actions in H .
Informally, the GNDCα ,K⊳ property requires that the behaviour of process P, once it is composed with any
possible environment E ∈ EH , is compliant with the system expected-behaviour, described by the func-
tion α . The notion of compliance depends on the ⊳K relation we select for comparing the behaviours
of (P‖HX)\H and α(P), according not only to an observational equivalence (as in the qualitative ap-
proach [17]), but also with respect to order induced by the semiring K.
In the following we provide several definitions of quantitative behavioural-equivalence according to
which we are able to specify weighted properties through the QGNDC schema [17]. Furthermore, we
compare the expressive power of the different equivalence-relations we define.
100 Quantitative-security Specification
3.1 Quantitative Trace-equivalences
One of the basic notions used in the literature to compare processes behaviour is the notion of trace: two
processes are equivalent if they exactly show the same execution sequences, ands their evaluation scores
are comparable in the semiring partial-order. In order to formally define traces, we need a transition
relation that does not consider internal moves, denoted by τ . We start by highlighting such τ-actions in
execution traces:
Definition 3.1 (weighted weak-trace). The notation P (a,k)==⇒ P′ is a shorthand for P (τ ,kτ )−−−→∗ Pτ (a,k)−−→
P′τ
(τ ,k′τ )−−−→∗ P′, where a (possibly empty) sequence of τ labeled transitions is denoted by (τ ,kτ )−−−→∗. A
weighted weak-trace γ = (a1,k1) . . . (an,kn) ∈ (Act\{τ})∗ is such that P
γ
==⇒ P′ if and only if there
exist P1, . . . ,Pn−1 ∈ GPA such that P
(a1,k1)
====⇒ P1 . . .Pn−1
(an,kn)
====⇒ P′.
We can now define an equivalence relation based on trace similarity, i.e., the weak-trace equivalence
(≈wtrace) in Def. 3.2. We require both the strong evaluation-score and the weak evaluation-score of two
processes to be equal, or not comparable:
Definition 3.2 (weak-trace equivalence). For any P ∈P the set ˆT (P) of weighted weak-traces associ-
ated with P is ˆT (P) = {γ ∈ (Act\{τ})∗ | ∃P′ : P γ==⇒ P′}, where (Act\{τ})∗ is the set of sequences of
actions. P and Q are weak-trace equivalent (notation P ≈wtrace Q) if and only if all the following three
conditions hold:
1. ˆT (P) = ˆT (Q),
2. J[PK] 6≶K J[QK],4 and
3. JPK 6≶K JQK.
Note that, the first two conditions are related to the observable traces of P and Q, while condition
3 allows us to compare the specific contribution of the τ-actions in terms of weight. In the following,
we provide an approximate version of weak-trace equivalence, i.e., the ε-trace relation. With respect to
Def. 3.2, we allow the weak evaluation-score of two processes to differ up to a threshold-value ε ∈ K.
Definition 3.3 (ε-trace equivalence). For any P ∈ P the set ˆT (P) of weighted weak-traces associated
with P is ˆT (P) = {γ ∈ (Act\{τ})∗ | ∃P′ : P γ==⇒ P′}, where (Act\{τ})∗ is the set of sequences of
actions. P and Q are ε-trace equivalent (notation P ≈ε−trace Q) if and only if there exists a value ε such
that all the following three conditions hold:
1. ˆT (P) = ˆT (Q),
2. J[PK] 6≶K JQK, and
3. JPK÷ ε ≥K JQK∧ JQK÷ ε ≥K JPK.
These relations are comparable one to another. In particular, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 3.1. For each couple of processes P,Q ∈ GPA. The following statement holds
∀ε ∈ K, P ≈wtrace Q ⇒ P ≈ε−trace Q
Note that when ε =⊤ we have P ≈wtrace Q ⇔ P≈ε−trace Q.
Example 3.1. Consider two processes P = (τ ,1).(a,3).(b,2) and Q = (a,2).(b,3) in the tropical semir-
ing. We have that P ≈1−trace Q (i.e., ε = 1), while P≈wtrace Q does not hold.
Note that P and Q in Ex. 3.1 are qualitatively trace-equivalent according to the classic definition
given in [17]. Therefore, by considering the weight of traces (i.e., weak-trace equivalence) we obtain a
more restrictive equivalence-relation. Consequently, we have introduced the notion ε-trace equivalence
with the purpose to gradually be able to relax it and include more processes in the relation.
4In the following we will use 6≶K as a shortcut to denote when two semiring values are equal or not comparable in the poset.
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3.2 Quantitative Bisimulation Equivalences
In this section we focus on the weak-bisimulation equivalence for GPA [10, 27], since we would like
to consider as equivalent the behaviour of two processes regardless the weight of internal action τ they
perform. Differently from [10], where only the definition of strong bisimulation is provided, we assume
that each state of a MLTS has a finite number of transitions with a non-⊤ weight. In the following, for
R a relation, we write PRQ to say that (P,Q) ∈R.
We extend the definition of quantitative weak bisimulation in [27] by considering a poset of prefer-
ence values:
Definition 3.4 (quantitative weak-bisimulation). An equivalence relation R on P×P is a quantitative
weak bisimulation if and only if for all (P,Q) ∈R and all a ∈ Act and each equivalence class C ∈R we
have:
∑
D∈C
(P
(a,k)
==⇒ D) 6≶ ∑
D∈C
(Q (a,k
′)
===⇒ D), ∑
D∈C
(P (τ ,kτ )−−−→∗ D) 6≶ ∑
D∈C
(Q (τ ,k′τ )−−−→∗ D)
We write P ≈K Q whenever there is a bisimulation R such that (P,Q) ∈R.
Note that the quantitative weak-bisimulation relation holds even if the two values related to P and Q
are incomparable in the partial order defined by +. In [27] they have to exactly correspond to the same
value, since partial orders are not considered.
As accomplished in Sec. 3.1, we define a variant that approximates Def. 3.4, named as weak ε-
bisimulation. The intuition behind it, similarly to Sec. 3.1, is to relax the cost of τ actions by a threshold-
value ε with the purpose to allow two processes to be bismilar (or, better, ε-bisimilar) despite this differ-
ence. More precisely, such ε value bounds the difference between the cost of τ actions before and after
an action at the same time (see Ex. 3.2).
Definition 3.5 (weak ε-bisimulation). An equivalence relation R on P×P is a weak ε-bisimulation if
and only if, there exists a value ε such that for all (P,Q) ∈R and all a ∈ Act and each equivalence class
C ∈R we have:
∑
D∈C
(P (a,k)==⇒ D)÷ ε ≥K ∑
D∈C
(Q (a,k
′)
−−−→D) ∧ ∑
D∈C
(Q (a,k)==⇒ D)÷ ε ≥K ∑
D∈C
(P (a,k
′)
−−−→ D)
∑
D∈C
(P τ,kτ−−→∗ D)÷ ε ≥K ∑
D∈C
(Q τ,k′τ−−→∗ D) ∧ ∑
D∈C
(Q τ,kτ−−→∗ D)÷ ε ≥K ∑
D∈C
(P τ,k
′
τ−−→∗ D)
We write P ≈ε Q whenever there is a bisimulation R such that (P,Q) ∈R.
These relations are comparable as follows.
Proposition 3.2. For each couple of processes P,Q ∈ GPA. The following statement holds
∀ε ∈ K P ≈K Q ⇒ P ≈ε Q
Note that when ε =⊤ we have P ≈K Q ⇔ P ≈ε Q
Example 3.2. Consider two processes P = (τ ,3).(a,4).(τ ,5) and Q = (τ ,2).(a,4).(τ ,1)(τ ,1) in the
tropical semiring. We have that P≈1 Q (i.e., ε = 1) while P≈K Q does not hold. Instead, if we have two
processes W = (τ ,3).(a,4).(τ ,3) and Y = (τ ,2).(a,4).(τ ,1).(τ ,1), W ≈2 Y (i.e., ε = 2) while W ≈1 Y
does not hold.
Note that both P and Q, and W and Y in Ex. 3.2 are weak bisimilar according to the classic definition
given in [28]. Therefore, by considering the bisimulation relation in Def. 3.4 we obtain a more restrictive
equivalence-relation.
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4 C-semiring H-M Logic
In the previous section, we have shown how quantitative security properties can be specified by using
several quantitative process-equivalences in order to compare the behaviour of a system with respect to
the expected one. A different approach for specifying quantitative security-requirements is to express
them as a logic formula that the system has to satisfy. It can be useful, for instance, when it is not decid-
able if two processes are quantitatively equivalent (as defined in Sec. 3). Furthermore, some properties
as, for example, safety properties5 , can be easily expressed through a logic formula and allow for not
requiring the behaviour of the whole system to be checked [15, 24].
For this reason, in the rest of this section we propose a different approach with respect to the one
described in Sec. 3, with the purpose to advance an alternative methodology to quantitatively specify the
security of a system. Such approach is based on Model Checking and a satisfiability procedure, instead
of behavioural equivalences and a comparison checking.
Hence, in order to specify whether a system is secure or not, we need to require that it satisfies a
logic formula expressing the intended security-requirements. To this aim, next we propose a quantitative
variant of the Hennessy-Milner logic, named c-HM, in such a way to be able to specify a quantitative for-
mula. In particular, differently from [23], where weights are associated to system states, in our approach
values are part of transition labels (together with an action): again we consider a MLTS (see Def. 2.5),
and we evaluate the satisfaction of a c-HM formula over processes expressed in GPA. In Def. 4.1, we
syntactically define the set ΦM of correct formulas given an MLTS M.
Definition 4.1 (syntax). Given a MLTS M = 〈S, Act,K,T,s0〉, and let a ∈ Act, a formula φ ∈ ΦM is
syntactically expressed as follows, where k ∈ K:
φ ::= k | φ1 +φ2 | φ1×φ2 | φ1⊓φ2 | 〈a〉φ | [a]φ
Clearly we can express more than just true (corresponding to ⊤ ∈ K) and false (⊥ ∈ K) through all
the values k ∈ K. Semiring operators + (the lub ⊔), glb ⊓, and × are used in place of classical logic
operators ∨ and ∧, in order to compose the truth values of two formulas together. As a reminder, when
the × operator is idempotent, then × and ⊓ coincide (see Sec. 2). Finally, we have the two classical
modal operators, i.e., “possibly” (〈·〉), and “necessarily” ([·]).
It is also possible to have a negation operator ¬ : K −→ K, which is a unary operator such that, being
A⊆ Act, ¬a∈ A and ¬¬(a) = a for all a∈ A, and ¬
⊔
{A′}= {¬a | a∈ A} for all A′ ⊆ A, where
⊔
and
d
are the set-wise lub and glb operators of the lattice 〈A,≤K〉. The negation operator allows us to use the
equivalence ¬⊥=⊤. Note that the duality ¬(a+b) = (¬a)× (¬b) holds exactly when × is idempotent.
Some examples where negation can be defined are the logical c-semiring, where logical negation is a
negation operator, and probabilistic and fuzzy c-semirings, where 1− is a negation operator. On the
other hand, it is not possible to define a negation operator for the tropical semiring. Hence, the syntax
given in Def. 4.1 is proposed without considering the negation operator; otherwise, we can simplify it by
removing ⊥ and [ ]φ , since they can be respectively rewritten as ¬⊤ and ¬〈〉¬φ .
The semantics of a formula φ is given on a particular MLTS M = 〈S,Act,K,T,s0〉, with the purpose
to check the specification defined by φ over the behaviour of a weighted transition-system (in Sec. 4.1,
M defines the behaviour of a GPA process). Note that, while in [2] the semantics of a formula computes
the states U ⊆ S that satisfy that formula, our semantics JKM : (ΦM × S) −→ K (see Tab. 2) computes a
truth value (in K) for the same U . For instance, if we use the boolean semiring we always obtain ⊤ iff
5E.g., properties expressing that, if something goes wrong, it can be detected in a finite number of steps
F. Martinelli, I. Matteucci & F. Santini 103
JkK(s) = k ∈ K ∀s ∈ S
Jφ1 +φ2K(s) = Jφ1K(s)+ Jφ2K(s)
Jφ1×φ2K(s) = Jφ1K(s)× Jφ2K(s)
Jφ1⊓φ2K(s) = Jφ1K(s)⊓ Jφ2K(s)
J〈a〉φK(s) = ∑
R
(T (s,a,s′)× JφK(s′))
J[a]φK(s) = d
R
(T (s,a,s′)× JφK(s′))
where R = {s′ ∈ S | s a→ s′ ∈ T}
Table 2: Semantics of c-HM. ∑( /0) =⊥ and d( /0) =⊤.
U 6= /0, and ⊥ otherwise. It is not difficult to extend our semantics to also return U , as in [2]; however, in
this work we are focused on computing a degree of satisfaction for φ (and U ).
In Tab. 2 and in the following (when clear from the context) we omit M from JKM for the sake of
readability. The semantics is parametrised over a state s∈ S, which is used to consider only the transitions
that can be fired at a given step (labelled with an action a). The first s will be the single initial state of
the MLTS we define in Def. 2.5, i.e., s0.6
4.1 Interpreting c-HM over GPA
Both GPA and c-HM logic formulas can be interpreted on a MLTS. In this section, we focus on the
interpretation of a c-HM formula φ on a GPA process P to provide a notion of quantitative satisfiability
for the specification described by φ , on the behaviour of a process P. First of all, we define the projection
of a process on an MLTS.
Definition 4.2 (MLTS projection). Given an MLTS M = 〈S,Act,K,T,s0〉, its projection over a process
P defined over the same M is defined as M ⇓P= 〈SP,Act,K,TP,s0〉, where SP = {s ∈ S | s ∈Der(P)} and
TP = {(s,a,s′) ∈ S×Act×S | s,s′ ∈ SP∧a ∈ Sort(P)}.7
We are now ready to rephrase the notion of satisfiability to take into account a threshold k (k-
satisfiability):
Definition 4.3 (|=k). A process P satisfies a c-HM formula φ with a threshold-value t, i.e., P |=t φ , if and
only if the interpretation of φ on M ⇓P is not worse than t. Formally:
P |=t φ ⇔ t ≤ JφKM⇓P(s0)
This means that P is a model for a formula φ (with respect to a certain value t) iff the evaluation of
φ on P is not worse than t in the partial order defined by + in K. It is worth noting that the interpretation
of φ on P is independent by the valuation of P itself.
Remark 1. Note that, if P does not satisfy a formula φ then JφKM⇓P = ⊥. Consequently, the only t
such that P |=t φ is t =⊥. If JφKM⇓P 6=⊥, then φ is satisfiable with a certain threshold t 6=⊥.
6Note that is also possible to let the semantics in Tab. 2 be parametrised on a set of states, by aggregating values on all the
transitions originating from all of them. For instance, in case we have multiple initial states, as in [10].
7All the processes in parallel share the same s0.
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k//P = k
(φ1×φ2)//P = (φ1)//P × (φ2)//P
(φ1 +φ2)//P = (φ1)//P +(φ2)//P
(φ1⊓φ2)//P = (φ1)//P ⊓ (φ2)//P
([a]φ1)//P =


[a](φ1)//P ⊓
d
Pa,ka→ P′
((ka)× (φ1)//P′ ) a 6∈ L
d
Pa,ka→ P′
((ka)× [a](φ1)//P′ ) a ∈ L
(〈a〉φ1)//P =


〈a〉(φ1)//P + ∑
Pa,ka→ P′
((ka)× (φ1)//P′ ) a 6∈ L
∑
Pa,ka→ P′
((ka)×〈a〉(φ1)//P′ ) a ∈ L
Table 3: A QPMC function.
Example 4.1. In order to exemplify the concept expressed here, let us consider a formula φ stating that
before opening a document “file2” you have to close an already opened document “file1” . This is a
security property aiming at preserving the confidentiality and integrity of the two documents. φ can be
expressed by a c-HM formula as follows:
φ = [open file1]([close file1][open file2]⊤× [open file2]⊥)
The sub-formula after × (i.e., [open file2]) is weighted with ⊥ because the opening of file2 has to be prevented
in case file1 is not closed. Vice-versa, the left-side of × expresses the right behaviour, and thus it is weighted with
⊤.
Then consider three different processes P and Q, defined on 〈N+∪{+∞},min,+ˆ,+∞,0〉 (i.e., the tropical semir-
ing):
P = (open file1,5).(close file1,4).0
Q = (open file1,3).(close file1,10).0
V = (open file1,4).(open file2,2).0
According to our definition, P |=11 φ because, referring to Tab. 2, at the first step we consider the cost of the action
open file1, i.e., 5, which is arithmetically summed to
J([close file1][open file2]0 +ˆ [open file2]∞)KP′
where P′ = (close file1,4).0. After close file1, the process halts, thus J[open file2]∞K = 0. Finally, we
have JφKP = 5 +ˆ 4 +ˆ 0 = 9, which satisfies the asked threshold 11. Q is evaluated in the same way, but since
JφKQ = 3 +ˆ10 +ˆ 0 = 13, we have that P 6|=11 φ because 11 6≤ 14. Therefore, even if there is a subset of Q states
that satisfies φ , the degree satisfaction does not respect the requested threshold. Finally, φ is not satisfied by V
because JφKV = 5 +ˆ J([close file1][open file2]0 +ˆ [open file2] ∞)KV ′ = 4 +ˆ2 +ˆ∞ = ∞.
5 Quantitative Partial Model Checking
In this section we present a quantitative version of PMC [2], named QPMC, with respect to the parallel
composition of GPA processes. Such a function is defined in Tab. 3. Being the logic closed, the interpre-
tation of a formula obtained through the application of such function is straightforward. In Th. 5.1 we
report a result similar (i.e., weighted) to the one in [2].
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Theorem 5.1. Given any two processes P and Q in parallel, and any c-HM formula φ , then we have that
JφKP‖LQ = Jφ//PKQ.
Sketch. 8 The proposition is proved by induction on the complexity of a formula φ .
Base case, φ = k: According to Tab. 2, JkKP‖Q = k = k//P = Jk//PKQ.
Inductive Step: As an example, let us now consider two different formulas:
φ = φ1×φ2: According to Tab. 2 we have that JφKP‖Q = Jφ1 × φ2KP‖Q = Jφ1KP‖Q × Jφ2KP‖Q.
By inductive hypothesis, Jφ1KP‖Q = J(φ1)//PKQ and Jφ2KP‖Q = J(φ2)//PKQ. Then Jφ1KP‖Q×Jφ2KP‖Q = J(φ1)//PKQ× J(φ2)//PKQ = J(φ1)//P × (φ2)//PKQ = J(φ1×φ2)//PKQ.
The + and the ⊓ operators can be similarly proved.
φ = 〈a〉φ1: According to Tab. 2, we have
JφKP‖Q = J〈a〉φ1KP‖Q = ∑
P‖Q (a,ka)−−−→(P‖Q)′
((ka)× Jφ1K(P‖Q)′).
Here we only prove one of several possible cases: if a 6∈ L, then
J〈a〉φ1KP‖Q = ∑
P‖Q (a,ka)−−−→(P‖Q)′
((ka)× Jφ1K(P‖Q)′)
where (P‖Q)′ is equal to P′‖Q if P (a,ka)−−−→ P′ or to P‖Q′ if Q (a,ka)−−−→ Q′. Hence,
∑
P‖Q (a,ka)−−−→(P‖Q)′
((ka)× Jφ1K(P‖Q)′) = ∑
P
(a,ka)
−−−→P′
((ka)× Jφ1K(P′‖Q))+ ∑
Q (a,ka)−−−→Q′
((ka)× Jφ1K(P‖Q′)).
By inductive hypothesis, this is equal to
∑
P
(a,ka)
−−−→P′
((ka)× J(φ1)//P′ KQ)+ ∑
Q (a,ka)−−−→Q′
((ka)× J(φ1)//PKQ′).
Hence, J〈a〉φ1KP‖Q = ∑
P
(a,ka)
−−−→P′
((ka)× J(φ1)//P′ KQ)+ J〈a〉(φ1)//PKQ. On the other hand,
φ//P = (〈a〉φ1)//P = 〈a〉(φ1)//P + ∑
P
(a,ka)
−−−→P′
((ka)× (φ1)//P′ )
and its semantics evaluation with respect to the process Q is J(〈a〉φ1)//PKQ =
J〈a〉(φ1)//P + ∑
P
(a,ka)
−−−→P′
((ka)× (φ1)//P′ )KQ = J〈a〉(φ1)//PKQ + J ∑
P
(a,ka)
−−−→P′
((ka)× (φ1)//P′ )KQ.
Hence J(〈a〉φ1)//PKQ = J〈a〉(φ1)//PKQ + ∑
P
(a,ka)
−−−→P′
((ka)× J(φ1)//P′ KQ).
8The interested reader can find the complete proof in the appendix of the technical report [26].
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Example 5.1. Let us consider, the tropical semiring 〈N+∪{+∞},min,+ˆ,+∞,0〉, and two actions open
and close (L = {open}). In addition, let us consider a formula φ = [open]〈close〉1 stating that once
a file is opened, then it has to be closed. We omit the name of the file because not significant for our
example. Let P and Q be two GPA processes:
P = (open,5).(close,4).0+(open,6).0 Q = (open,4).(close,3).0
Let us consider the combined process P‖LQ, where P and Q synchronise one another on actions in L, i.e., on the
action open. It is easy to see that P‖LQ |=20 φ . By applying QPMC to φ w.r.t. P we obtain:
φ//P = (5× [open](〈close〉1)//P′)⊓ (6× [open]〈(close〉1)//P′)
= (5× [open](〈close〉1+(4× 1))⊓ (6× [open](〈close〉1+(4× 1))
where += min, ×≡ +ˆ, and ⊓≡max. The QPMC function helps to understand which formula Q has to
satisfy in order to guarantee that the whole system satisfies the initial requirement. In this simple case,
we know the behaviour of Q and we can check if it quantitatively satisfies φ//P. To do this, we prove that
JφKP‖LQ = Jφ//PKQ. We have:
JφKP‖LQ = max(9+(min(4,3)),10+ 3)= max(12,13) = 13,
Jφ//PKQ = max(5+(4+min(3,5)),6+(4+min(3,5)))= max(12,13) = 13.
6 Related Work
The aim of this work is to present a semiring-based formal framework where to deal with quantitative
specification of security in combined systems. We dedicate the first part of this section to alternative
definitions of quantitative bisimulation relations, in some cases even not applied to security (e.g., [27]).
In [27] the authors extend Weighted Labelled Transition Systems (WLTS) towards other behavioural
equivalences, by considering semirings of weights. The main result of such work is the definition of
a general notion of weak weighted bisimulation. They show that this relation coincides with the usual
weak bisimulation in case of non-deterministic and fully-probabilistic systems. Moreover, it can also
be extended towards kinds of LTSs where this notion is currently missing (e.g., stochastic systems). In
Def. 3.3 we also relax quantitative weak-bisimulation to weak ε-bisimulation.
In [1] the authors address the problem of providing a quantitative estimation of the confidentiality of
a system by measuring its information leakage. In our analysis the most powerful adversary is measured
via a notion of approximate process equivalence. In practice, the lack of information leakage is expressed
by a successful weak probabilistic bisimulation based check. Whenever such a check fails, approximate
relations relax the conditions imposed by the weak probabilistic-bisimulation, in such a way that the
level of approximation represents an estimate of the amount of information leakage. Our notion of ε-
bisimulation is very close to [1], except that we generalise it by using semiring operators.
Even the approach in [18] bounds the distance between the transitions of two states: if their distance
is less equal than a threshold δ , and this holds for all the states of two processes P1 and P2, such processes
are said to be approximately bisimilar with a δ -precision. The motivations is that, interacting with the
physical world, exact relationships are restrictive and not robust.
The literature also proposes works using fuzzy weights (in this work we have the fuzzy semiring): in
[11] a notion of behavioural distance is given to measure the behavioural similarity of non-deterministic
fuzzy-transition systems. Two systems are at zero distance if and only if they are bisimilar.
Considering the second fragment of the paper, no direct comparison is available for QPMC. Never-
theless, our c-semiring H-M Logic (see Sec. 4) has been inspired by the work in [23]. Some examples
of quantitative temporal logic are [14, 3]. In [14] the authors present QLTL, a quantitative analogue of
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LTL and presents algorithms for Model Checking it over a quantitative version of Kripke structures and
Markov chains. Thus, weights are in the interval of Real numbers [0,1]. In [3] the authors combine
robustness scores with the satisfaction probability to optimise some control parameters of a stochastic
model: the goal is to best maximise robustness of the desired specifications. However, even this approach
is focused on Continuous-Time Markov Chains, and not on semiring algebraic-structures.
Non-binary measures of security have been considered for access control systems by Cheng et
al. [12]. The level of security should correspond to a fuzzy domain rather than a strict separation be-
tween what is secure and what is not. Zhang et al. define with the BARAC model [31] a notion of benefit
for each access, with the underlying idea that allowing an access comes with a benefit for the system.
The “value” of an access or an action can be for instance calculated using market-based techniques [29].
From a different perspective, Bielova and Massacci propose in [4] a notion of distance among traces,
thus expressing that if a trace is not secure, it should be edited to a secure trace close to the non-secure
one, thus characterising enforcement strategies by the distance from the original trace they create. In [13],
a similar notion of cost has been introduced following some intuitive leads given in [25] in order to move
from qualitative to quantitative enforcement. Semirings have been used by Bistarelli et al. in the context
of access control [6] and trust systems [5]. Here we use them in the context of enforcement mechanism
defined trough process algebra, following the approach by Buchholz and Kemper [10].
7 Conclusion
We have introduced two different formal-frameworks oriented to the specification of quantitative proper-
ties on a GPA-process. Both of the frameworks are have a common trait d’union consisting in the use of
c-semiring structures to represent transition costs. By taking advantage of such costs, we can constrain
classical qualitative-relations between two processes, as we do as our first contribute for trace equiva-
lence and weak bisimulation equivalence. In practice we parametrise the weak bisimulation notion given
in [1] by allowing for different metrics, and not probability scores only. At the same time we refine the
definition of semiring-based bisimulation given in [27], by extending the relation in order to consider
ε-close processes. As a second result, we propose a way to express security constraints via a quantita-
tive version of the Hennessy-Milner logic, and a method for specifying the security of a system through
a quantitative version of PMC, which allows us to move a process from the parallel computation to a
formula φ . If the system satisfies a security property with a value k worse than t (a security threshold),
then the system is not quantitatively secure. In this way we can use this threshold to tradeoff security
and functionality/performance requirements.
The essence of the paper is to advance the same basic bricks (i.e., GPA and semirings) with the
purpose to enhance two different quantitative frameworks (i.e., process equivalences and PMC), which
are nevertheless related by the common purpose of (security) property specification. Of course both of
the frameworks can be independently (but still interlacedly) developed to offer a complete specification
and validation tool on their own, as the following ideas on future work suggest.
In the future we aim to extend both the approaches in different directions. As an ongoing work,
we are investigating on the definition of the characteristic formula of a processes, with respect to each
bisimulation equivalence definitions we have provided in Sec. 3. In such way, we will be able to compare
the effectiveness of the two proposed approaches. Furthermore, we aim to extend both of them in order
to not only use them for the specification has but also for the analysis. Indeed, referring to the former
approach, we need to investigate on the characterisation of the most powerful attacker in order to compare
the system under attack, with respect to the expected behaviour. This can be done only under certain
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constraints on the considered equivalences. Referring on the latter approach, we need to elaborate a
satisfiability procedure for the quantitative logic we have introduced here in order to verify if the system
under investigation is secure or not, i.e., it satisfies the security requirement.
Another possible direction we would like to investigate is the identification of comparative strategies
based on the (partial or total) ordering of the semiring. In this way we can compare different strategies
and finally synthesise the best one (whether it exists). Another direction is the extension of the framework
to use more than one measure associated to each action in order to evaluate a process. Such measures
can be combined and ordered, e.g., by using the lexicographical ordering, in such a way that controlling
strategies can be selected with respect to the optimisation of the trade-off between some of them.
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